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
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18 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director, Intelligence Community Staff

Chief, Community Counterintelligence Staff

NSSD-2/82 Study Director

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: .

Response to NSSD-2/82

One of the things we are going to have to do with the response to NSSD-2/82 is to give the policymakers a fix on the size of the overall US Government counterintelligence effort and of the people applied to dealing with it in each agency and for each significant function. Without that, there is nothing to come to grips with in seeking to measure how and to what extent the capabilities need to be enhanced. I recognize the need for caution to developing priorities, but there is a need for developing some kind of a roadmap on where one would start in improving the overall capabilities for dealing with the situation.

William J. Casey

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Executive Registry

18 June 1982 CI 155-82

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Deputy Director for Operations

FROM:

Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

SUBJECT:

DCI Comments on Draft CI Study--NNSD-2/82

At your request I have reviewed the draft study and your comments on it. The paper which you read and marked up was the first draft, and some of your suggestions, as well as other additions and changes, have been incorporated into later drafts: I have compared the first draft and your comments with the latest available draft, and I am sending separately to the Study Director (copy attached) a paper with some general comments of my own and a list of 25 suggested changes, ranging from several words to several paragraphs each. The suggested changes are keyed to the latest draft but most are directly related to your own comments and marginal notes. The suggestions are intended to help shape the paper in line with what I perceive to be your objectives.

- With the exception of some of your marginal notes in parts of the paper based on input from other agencies, where I did not feel competent to comment, I found myself in basic agreement with most of your suggestions, including most of the "stylistic nitpicking" as you termed it. The biggest shortcoming of the paper, in my opinion, was the fact that CIA responsibilities and capabilities were indeed given short shrift. Most of my suggested additions are intended to rectify that weakness. (This may be resisted somewhat by the Study Director, as he is understandably trying to keep the paper from growing too In other words, most of my proposed changes were geared to the problem you discussed in paragraph 2 d of your memorandum.
- Regarding paragraph 2 b of your memorandum, I'm not certain I understand what you mean by "potential for better analysis through joint analytical centers". This seems to me to come dangerously close to proposing a joint analytical facility, centrally run, to which all agencies would contribute. I believe that such a facility is neither necessary nor workable.

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This is so because there is in being an effective liaison relationship among the various services which permits them to exchange the information they need without relinquishing control over the source-sensitive aspects. This is a very important principle for both the DDO and the FBI, and one on which neither service will compromise. Certainly, however, increased resources in the analytical capabilities of the various components are needed.

- Regarding your paragraph 3, I found the version of Section VI in the latest draft much better than the one in the first draft, which you had already described as "quite good." The latest draft incorporates resource shortfalls which affect the ability of the FBI and CIA to carry out counterintelligence operations. The earlier draft had focussed on defensive CI problems, and I believe it is just as important, if not more so, to point out the resource shortcomings which restrict our offensive ability to mount counterintelligence operations.
- I think that with the changes you have requested, and with some additional editing and polishing, the final product will be quite acceptable.

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Attachment: A/S CONCUR: John H. Stein 🧻 g JUN 15c -Deputy Director for Operations Date

DDO/DC/CI

Distribution:

Original - DCI w/att

2 - DDO Registry w/o att

∠ - Executive Reg. w/o att 1 - Study Director w/att

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